Despite everything, an Israeli-Syrian peace deal could move forward
Thanks to the committed work of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Israel and Syria are in their fourth rounds of low-level talks. Despite this unprecedented peaceful interaction (the two nations last broke of talks in 2000), they are still as far away from any tangible “land-for-recognition” peace deal as they have ever been in the past decade. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) is still licking its wounds from a resounding defeat in 2006 when the comparatively weak Hezbollah held them off for 33 days. Israel is also plagued by an unstable Kadima government lead by Prime Minister Olmert who is under investigation for multiple counts of fraud. Despite the Prime Minister’s aid's assertion that “the sky [has] not fallen,” many see Olmert as the very definition of a lame duck. With a Kadima primary set for September 17 of this year, there is no doubt that Foreign Minister Tzipi Livini or another party strongman will succeed him.
Unlike the United States, where presidents lose a considerable amount of power midway through their last year in office, Israeli prime ministers never fully lose control of the national agenda. Last week’s prisoner transfer with Hezbollah proves that the Olmert government is still able to effectively define the facts on the ground, meaning that despite the ongoing investigations against him, he may be able to make significant progress with the Syrians. It would be difficult for any future Israeli government, even one lead by Likud, to turn its back on major progress made with Syria. Israelis still overwhelmingly support peace with their northeastern neighbor, and any deal could have serious implications for the region. The Syrians are cautious of a weak Olmert but they too look forward to the change in the balance of power that negotiating a settlement with the Israelis would bring. Below is the framework for what a long overdue peace deal between Israel and Syria could look like.
At present, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad is caught between a rock and a hard place. On one side, the United States has continued its push to keep Syria isolated from the West and the world community at large. UN Ambassador John Bolton went as far as to mention Syria in his ‘Beyond the Axis of Evil’ speech in 2002, and Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz have alluded to the possibility of overthrowing the Assad regime. Although such a scenario was more plausible before the invasion of Iraq, it still scares the militarily weak Assad.
The United States’ verbal attacks on Syria have pushed it to form an unlikely alliance with Iran. Assad’s Alawite regime is hardly a natural ally of the Iranian Ayatollahs, who see his sect as an apostate version of Shiism. The Iranians have chosen to look beyond this fact, because of the strategic location that Syria plays in the region. With Syria’s acquiescence, Iran is able to funnel arms and training to Hezbollah and Hamas, which in turn widens the Iranian sphere of influence. With a strong Hezbollah in play, Iran is able to indirectly attack both Israel and the pro-Western Christian leadership in Beirut. It is no secret that the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war began with the blessing of Tehran.
A destabilized Lebanon allows Syria to play a strong roll in the country. Hezbollah also acts as a buffer between the IDF and Damascus, ensuring that in any future conflict with Syria, Israel will have to fight a two-front war, a fact that keeps Israeli intelligence up at night while calming Assad. A weakened Lebanon also allows Syria to leverage its power over the lucrative legal and illegal financial centers in Beirut, providing hundreds of millions of dollars for the cash-strapped government.
Syria is wary of its current relationship with Iran, however. Damascus wants a weak Lebanon, not one controlled by the same extremists who run Tehran. Being surrounded by two potentially unfriendly Shii neighbors could prove dangerous for Syria who has continued to suppress its Shii minority. Because of this, Damascus is looking for a way to neutralize the Hezbollah threat by cutting of its supplies and training. This cannot be done however, until Syria has secured peace along its southern border with Israel. Until this is done, Damascus is determined to keep Hezbollah strong as a buffer against Tel Aviv.
Any peace deal with Syria is ultimately in Israel’s favor. The Golan Heights no longer holds the military significance that it did back in the 1970’s. Syrian missiles fired from Damascus can now reach Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Despite this, the Syrian air force is still impotent, and any troops attacking Israel from the Golan could be easily taken out. Because of this, not even the conservative Netanyahu government (1996-1999) made any serious attempts to annex the Golan. Since 1973, it has been accepted that Israel would someday return it to Syria in exchange for a permanent peace deal.
Now that the Kadima government is failing, those in power are looking for any rays of hope that will help them maintain their power. Olmert is attempting to divert attention away from his domestic failings by engaging the international community in attempts to make any kind of peace. This has been evident for several months now, as Israel has vigorously pursued peace with Syria and the Palestinians, as well as making overt calls for peace with Lebanon. Olmert has recently turned towards the United States (Annapolis Conference, November 2007), France (Mediterranean Summit, July 2008) and Turkey (Syrian Talks, ongoing), looking for any way to get a major peace deal done before his power completely erodes. Nonetheless, any peace deal will in all likelihood come only after Olmert has left government, as the primary election will occur in two months and any deal will certainly take more time than that to complete.
Assad, for his part, does not want to legitimize Olmert in any way since he holds the Prime Minister personally responsible for the Israeli attack on the Syrian nuclear reactor last fall. The attack both reaffirmed Israel’s continued dominance of the skies and demonstrated Damascus’s inability to defend against Israeli incursions into its territory. Giving up the Golan would not weaken Israel’s ability to strike at Syria, as even the most advanced Russian anti-aircraft weapons were unable to detect the Israeli strike. Assad knows this, but he also knows that ‘liberating’ the Golan would provide a huge boost for the government internally while also allowing Syria to declare a victory over its life-long enemy.
The actual returning of the Golan would be primarily symbolic for both sides. Israel would get peace with a neighbor that it views primarily as a pest, while Syria would get back a relatively uninhabitable piece of territory that is militarily insignificant. What would not be symbolic however, would be the implications of a Golan deal. It would be a significant step in isolating Iran, as the United States would surely make serious overtures to Syria after peace was reached (at the behest of Israel). It would be a serious step towards neutralizing the military component of Hezbollah, which would see its weapons caches dry up. It would also signify that Syria was serious in normalizing the relationship with Lebanon that it established at the Mediterranean Summit. For these reasons, returning the Golan to Syria would be a victory for both Israel and the United States.
Unlike the United States, where presidents lose a considerable amount of power midway through their last year in office, Israeli prime ministers never fully lose control of the national agenda. Last week’s prisoner transfer with Hezbollah proves that the Olmert government is still able to effectively define the facts on the ground, meaning that despite the ongoing investigations against him, he may be able to make significant progress with the Syrians. It would be difficult for any future Israeli government, even one lead by Likud, to turn its back on major progress made with Syria. Israelis still overwhelmingly support peace with their northeastern neighbor, and any deal could have serious implications for the region. The Syrians are cautious of a weak Olmert but they too look forward to the change in the balance of power that negotiating a settlement with the Israelis would bring. Below is the framework for what a long overdue peace deal between Israel and Syria could look like.
At present, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad is caught between a rock and a hard place. On one side, the United States has continued its push to keep Syria isolated from the West and the world community at large. UN Ambassador John Bolton went as far as to mention Syria in his ‘Beyond the Axis of Evil’ speech in 2002, and Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz have alluded to the possibility of overthrowing the Assad regime. Although such a scenario was more plausible before the invasion of Iraq, it still scares the militarily weak Assad.
The United States’ verbal attacks on Syria have pushed it to form an unlikely alliance with Iran. Assad’s Alawite regime is hardly a natural ally of the Iranian Ayatollahs, who see his sect as an apostate version of Shiism. The Iranians have chosen to look beyond this fact, because of the strategic location that Syria plays in the region. With Syria’s acquiescence, Iran is able to funnel arms and training to Hezbollah and Hamas, which in turn widens the Iranian sphere of influence. With a strong Hezbollah in play, Iran is able to indirectly attack both Israel and the pro-Western Christian leadership in Beirut. It is no secret that the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war began with the blessing of Tehran.
A destabilized Lebanon allows Syria to play a strong roll in the country. Hezbollah also acts as a buffer between the IDF and Damascus, ensuring that in any future conflict with Syria, Israel will have to fight a two-front war, a fact that keeps Israeli intelligence up at night while calming Assad. A weakened Lebanon also allows Syria to leverage its power over the lucrative legal and illegal financial centers in Beirut, providing hundreds of millions of dollars for the cash-strapped government.
Syria is wary of its current relationship with Iran, however. Damascus wants a weak Lebanon, not one controlled by the same extremists who run Tehran. Being surrounded by two potentially unfriendly Shii neighbors could prove dangerous for Syria who has continued to suppress its Shii minority. Because of this, Damascus is looking for a way to neutralize the Hezbollah threat by cutting of its supplies and training. This cannot be done however, until Syria has secured peace along its southern border with Israel. Until this is done, Damascus is determined to keep Hezbollah strong as a buffer against Tel Aviv.
Any peace deal with Syria is ultimately in Israel’s favor. The Golan Heights no longer holds the military significance that it did back in the 1970’s. Syrian missiles fired from Damascus can now reach Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Despite this, the Syrian air force is still impotent, and any troops attacking Israel from the Golan could be easily taken out. Because of this, not even the conservative Netanyahu government (1996-1999) made any serious attempts to annex the Golan. Since 1973, it has been accepted that Israel would someday return it to Syria in exchange for a permanent peace deal.
Now that the Kadima government is failing, those in power are looking for any rays of hope that will help them maintain their power. Olmert is attempting to divert attention away from his domestic failings by engaging the international community in attempts to make any kind of peace. This has been evident for several months now, as Israel has vigorously pursued peace with Syria and the Palestinians, as well as making overt calls for peace with Lebanon. Olmert has recently turned towards the United States (Annapolis Conference, November 2007), France (Mediterranean Summit, July 2008) and Turkey (Syrian Talks, ongoing), looking for any way to get a major peace deal done before his power completely erodes. Nonetheless, any peace deal will in all likelihood come only after Olmert has left government, as the primary election will occur in two months and any deal will certainly take more time than that to complete.
Assad, for his part, does not want to legitimize Olmert in any way since he holds the Prime Minister personally responsible for the Israeli attack on the Syrian nuclear reactor last fall. The attack both reaffirmed Israel’s continued dominance of the skies and demonstrated Damascus’s inability to defend against Israeli incursions into its territory. Giving up the Golan would not weaken Israel’s ability to strike at Syria, as even the most advanced Russian anti-aircraft weapons were unable to detect the Israeli strike. Assad knows this, but he also knows that ‘liberating’ the Golan would provide a huge boost for the government internally while also allowing Syria to declare a victory over its life-long enemy.
The actual returning of the Golan would be primarily symbolic for both sides. Israel would get peace with a neighbor that it views primarily as a pest, while Syria would get back a relatively uninhabitable piece of territory that is militarily insignificant. What would not be symbolic however, would be the implications of a Golan deal. It would be a significant step in isolating Iran, as the United States would surely make serious overtures to Syria after peace was reached (at the behest of Israel). It would be a serious step towards neutralizing the military component of Hezbollah, which would see its weapons caches dry up. It would also signify that Syria was serious in normalizing the relationship with Lebanon that it established at the Mediterranean Summit. For these reasons, returning the Golan to Syria would be a victory for both Israel and the United States.
3 comments:
Ezra,
I enjoyed reading your analysis of the situation in Israel. I have not spent much time studying the relationships between Israel and her neighbors as my focus generally concerns the Gulf countries. I hope to keep reading your blog while I am studying in Oman this coming fall. During that time, I plan to keep up my own blog on my studies and travels, hopefully providing some indepth analysis like you have.
I will definitely be sure to keep this in mind while I am traveling in Iran over winter break as well. i wonder if we will be seeing in progress on this issue in the next few months.
Well played brother, I enjoyed reading your article as well. I am pleased at your support for a peace deal and enjoyed your analysis. What I think is missing is an emphasis on the role of the United States in helping Israel achieve a peace agreement with Syria. In the words of Ehud Barak "I don't think we will have negotiations before the end of this year without the contribution of the Americans, who alone can help bridge the gaps." Obviously there is close cooperation between Israel and the United States on foreign policy and right now Bush's foreign policy team has dropped the ball.
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